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External interventions and civil war intensity in south-central Somalia (1991-
2010)1
External interventions in conflicts are prescribed to be peace-promoting mechanisms, 
but their effects seldom de-escalate conflict intensity. Based on the balance of capabilities 
theory, this paper tests the effects that the type of intervention, military or diplomatic, 
and the target of the intervention, partisan or neutral, has on conflict intensity. In the 
case of Somalia, for the period 1991 to 2010, the results suggest that neutral interven-
tions, either military (humanitarian) or diplomatic, can lead to lower conflict intensity, 
but if partisan and military they lead to higher conflict intensity. If partisan and diplo-
matic and provided to both sides of the conflict they have no effect on conflict intensity. 
The conclusion is that peace competes with other objectives of external interventions.
Keywords: external intervention, military intervention, economic intervention, 
mediation, civil war, conflict management, Somalia 
Intervenções externas e intensidade da guerra civil no centro e sul da Somália 
(1991-2010)
Apesar de as intervenções externas em conflitos armados serem consideradas meca-
nismos para a promoção da paz, estas raramente diminuem a intensidade do conflito. Este 
artigo utiliza a teoria do equilíbrio de forças num conflito para testar os efeitos que as 
intervenções têm na intensidade do conflito, diferenciando-as por tipo de intervenção, mi-
litar ou diplomática, e objetivo da intervenção, partidário ou neutro. No caso da Somália, 
no período entre 1991 e 2010, os resultados sugerem que as intervenções neutrais, quer 
sejam militares (com fins humanitários) ou diplomáticas, podem diminuir a intensidade 
do conflito. No entanto, se as intervenções forem partidárias e militares podem conduzir a 
uma intensificação do conflito. Por outro lado, se partidárias e diplomáticas e providencia-
das para ambos os grupos em conflito, as intervenções não têm efeito sobre a intensidade 
do conflito. A conclusão é que os objetivos de promoção da paz concorrem com outros 
objetivos das intervenções externas. 
Palavras-chave: intervenção externa, intervenção militar, intervenção económica, 
mediação, guerra civil, gestão de conflitos, Somália 
Recebido 12 de junho de 2013; Aceite 8 de outubro de 2014
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of Lisbon (PTDC/AFR/100460/2008), funded by the same foundation. I would like to thank comments by Tefera 
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External interventions are a mechanism the international community uses for 
conflict management in a country. Intervention effects are determined by the mo-
tivations of the intervening parties and the effectiveness of the military, economic 
or diplomatic initiatives undertaken. But, at the same time, the relationship be-
tween interventions and conflict is endogenous, which makes it difficult to deter-
mine when interventions are causing a conflict pattern or when interventions are 
responses to conflict patterns. 
It has been suggested that the expected effect of external interventions on civil 
wars is to de-escalate conflict intensity in order to allow a mediation process to 
unfold. This is attributed directly not only to diplomatic initiatives but also to 
military and economic initiatives. The underlying assumption is that interveners’ 
motives, regardless of the type of intervention, are primarily “peace promoting” 
(Regan, 2002a). 
This paper questions this assumption by examining how military and dip-
lomatic interventions and interveners’ motivations are associated with conflict 
intensity. The paper aims to contribute to the broader literature in international 
interventions and conflict management. 
The paper starts by presenting the theoretical formulation that external inter-
ventions are mainly conflict management mechanisms; we then propose three 
expected mechanisms for military and diplomatic interventions and interven-
ers’ motivations. The proposed mechanisms are then tested on a case study of 
Somalia for the period 1991 to 2010. For the sake of clarity, the conflict-interven-
tions analysis is sub-divided into four periods. The data is based on secondary 
sources relying on a conflict event dataset for a monthly account of battle-related 
deaths as a measure of conflict intensity. 
In the final section we present the results which show that it is the combina-
tion of type and target of interventions which determines the effect of interven-
tions on conflict intensity. We also show that conflict intensity does not seem 
to determine interveners’ interventions, meaning that more bloodshed does not 
increase the chance of more interventions.
External interventions and conflict intensity 
A broad conceptualisation of interventions would consider that they can be 
forcible or non-forcible, direct or indirect (through the use of a proxy state), open 
or clandestine (covert) operations perpetrated by state and non-state actors and 
are not necessarily lawful or unlawful but should break the conventional pattern 
of international relations (Vincent, 1974, p. 13). 
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More specifically, for the case of intra-state conflict, Regan (2002a) and 
Rosenau (1971) define external interventions as convention-breaking military, 
economic or political activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country that are 
targeted at the authority structures of the government (biased, in support of the 
government or the opposition, or neutral), with the aim of affecting the balance 
of power between the parties in the conflict. There are different types of inter-
ventions, for instance the traditional peacekeeping operations normally with a 
neutral mandate, and military, economic or diplomatic interventions which can 
be both in support of only one side or neutral2.
This definition is associated with the traditional conceptualisation of civil war 
as a state (with a government) that is challenged by at least one political group 
using armed force over a sustained period and producing a minimum threshold 
of deaths. Battle deaths are a clear indication of the extraordinary nature of the 
period under review (even if the conflict is protracted) and of the intensity of 
conflict (Gleditsch et al., 2002).
Since 1991 Somalia has usually been referred to as an extreme case of “state 
collapse”, a country characterized by a constellation of commercial city-states 
and villages separated by areas of pastoral statelessness without a central author-
ity (Menkhaus, 2006). In this sense, the identification of a state is more formal 
than de facto in Somalia, where there is a more decentralized form of conflict. In 
this way, the civil war in Somalia is not only of a state-based type, associated with 
conflict involving an internationally recognized group representing the “state”, 
which in Somalia was the case with two transitional governments, being chal-
lenged by other group(s), but involves conflicts of other types. 
Despite the ethnic homogeneity, Somalian society is characterised by a clan 
system structured around six major clan families (the Darod, the Isaaq, the Dir, 
the Hawiye, the Rahanwein and the Digil), which then break down into sub-
clans. The clan families are “communities of relations” with common genealogy 
and complex networks of relationships (Ssereo, 2003). Typically, clan militia re-
spond to clan elders but operate in a decentralised and opportunistic guerrilla 
fashion. Linked to both “state collapse” and clan politics are the warlords, who 
are characterised by their personal rule paradigm, the monopolization of eco-
nomic resources and the extensive use of coercion through militias (Clapham, 
2 In this definition interventions are neutral in the sense that they are provided to both sides or do not directly 
increase the fighting capabilities of the parties. Examples of the former are the provision of economic support to 
both sides and military support to both sides to oversee a ceasefire or a demilitarized zone. A classic example of 
the latter is the provision of mediators. 
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2002). They also oppose any effort to impose government in the capital, in this 
way avoiding predatory government practices (Menkhaus, 2007)3.
In this context, conflict in Somalia is not only state based but also, signifi-
cantly, of two other types. One type is conflict involving actors fighting each 
other without the state’s involvement (normally called non-state conflict or com-
munal violence); the other type is groups (or the state) attacking civilian popu-
lations (normally referred to as one-sided conflict). Such specificity of conflict 
can be accommodated in the above definition of external interventions, where 
the “authority” is the diverse groups competing for control of different levels of 
power in pastoral areas, communities, towns, regional administrations, states or 
the central government4.
Within this definition of external interventions, it has been proposed that in-
terventions attempt to control hostilities, and ceteris paribus, interventions should 
reduce conflict (Regan, 2002a). Therefore the success of interventions is assessed 
in terms of their capacity to lower conflict intensity, as in the number of battle 
deaths, or decrease the duration of conflict, as in the days, months or years the 
conflict is active (Högbladh, Pettersson & Themnér, 2011). In Regan (2002a) the 
point of “departure for outlining the goals of the interveners works from the as-
sumption that states intervene to stop the fighting between groups in conflict” 
(p. 10). Furthermore, 
it is assumed that third parties do not intervene to exacerbate or prolong the fight-
ing. The key issue here is the desire by the intervener to bring stability to a specific 
region; one approach for achieving this – and the one that is under consideration 
– is the active intervention by a third party into the ongoing conflict (p. 11). 
One way to achieve this is by the intervener trying to bolster one side to com-
pel the opposing side to quit fighting, which can come about through a ceasefire 
or one side’s defeat (Regan, 1996, p. 340). The missing link in this argument is 
that the peaceful objectives of interveners are conditional on who would be the 
possible winner in a conflict. An intervention indifferent to the outcome of a con-
flict and focused solely on de-escalation or ending the conflict would primarily 
support the strongest side so that victory would be more likely. It has been pro-
posed that a victory is the most decisive outcome to a conflict and the one type 
3 It is relevant to highlight that it is not clear if “state collapse” precedes or is a consequence of warlordism and 
that warlords in Somalia are not necessarily clan based (Marchal, 2007).
4 State collapse cannot be equated with criminality and armed conflict as areas of non-existent state authority 
have enjoyed peace and the rule of law at the same time that areas with state authority have been prone to con-
flict. This means the assumption is not that “state collapse” leads to conflict in Somalia, but that in the context 
of “state collapse” different types of conflict occur. The three types of conflict: state based, non-state based and 
one-sided violence will inform the empirical analysis. 
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less likely to lead to conflict recurrence, specially in identity civil wars (Licklider, 
1995). In the cases where a military victory seems unlikely, an alternative strat-
egy could be to support the weaker side to the extent that a military stalemate 
is reached (possibly by increasing its fighting capability), forcing both parties 
to engage in negotiations, which could eventually lead to a lasting peace agree-
ment. Studies also suggest that a comprehensive peace agreement implemented 
through a peace operation has a better success rate in securing peace than a mili-
tary victory (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006).
In either case, interveners are more likely to pay close attention to the con-
ditions of the conflict and simultaneously to which parties would better repre-
sent the interests of the interveners. If a preferred party is losing the war, it is 
more likely it will be supported to remove the possibility of its military defeat. 
Additionally, if negotiations are being pursued, external parties can add extra 
conditions on the political solutions to be found and therefore make it more dif-
ficult to reach an agreement. 
Even the sub-set of interventions that occur after the end of intense fighting, 
especially the ones targeting the implementation of a peace agreement but also 
following a victory or a de-escalation of the conflict, can be prone to conflict. 
The adoption of the liberal peacebuilding model by international organisations 
since the end of the Cold War rests on the claim that liberalization promotes 
self-sustainable peace. But even these peacekeeping and peacebuilding interven-
tions, promoting a governance model based on market democracy, can have a 
destabilizing effect if implemented too quickly (Paris, 2002, 2004). Other critics 
of peacebuilding process consider instead that the failure to reach peace is the 
consequence of interventions that are not localized – responsible to local condi-
tions –, which do not engage the subject of the intervention in a contract with an 
understanding of what is viable in the specific context (Richmond, 2010). These 
conflict prone outcome can be identified even if the neutral interventions are not 
intended to promote the fighting capacity of the parties or exacerbate the con-
flict. 
Therefore, on the one hand, the assumption is that interventions are not in-
tended to exacerbate the fighting, but on the other hand, an intervention may 
have unintended consequences or may intentionally bolster one side of the con-
flict, regardless of its effect on the conditions that would lead to a faster peace. 
This paper looks precisely at this tension and proposes that interveners may 
not be motivated initially to stop the fighting (in this case by lowering intensity). 
It considers that external interventions in conflict processes refer mainly to the 
balancing of capabilities between groups (Regan, 2010) connected to the goals or 
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objectives of interveners and combatants. The interventions can aim to ensure a 
group’s victory or its demise, to enhance the position of the groups in negotiation 
processes or to reach a stalemate so that negotiations can begin. This may mean 
an escalation (e.g. through direct military support or imposing unattainable ne-
gotiation positions) or de-escalation (e.g. by withholding military support or pro-
moting mediation) of the conflict. This definition departs from Regan (2010) in 
the sense that it more clearly formulates that interveners promote peace if they 
can but through conflict if they must.
Effects of external interventions on conflict intensity 
The focus of the analysis is the effect of external interventions on conflict in-
tensity. Because of the focus on conflict intensity, the choice of a single case study 
is appropriate, as variation of intensity can be observed across time. Nevertheless, 
quantitative studies of conflict have focused more on conflict duration than on 
conflict intensity. Because of this research scarcity and because conflict duration 
can be considered a measure of (sustained) intensity, this literature is used as a 
reference for inference on expected mechanisms. 
The classical type of military intervention involves the deployment of mili-
tary personnel across recognized borders, with other less intrusive actions be-
ing the provision of military equipment or aid, provision of technical support or 
intelligence information or withholding military support. This type of support 
is considered more conflict prone as it directly increases the fighting capacity of 
the groups. Comparatively, economic interventions impact more indirectly on 
the fighting capacity of the parties. Nevertheless, the provision of loans, grants, 
non-military equipment, expertise or the imposition of economic sanctions can 
significantly affect the resources and resolve of the conflicting groups. Also, both 
military and economic interventions can be associated with a de-escalation of 
conflict, for instance, when neutral military interventions have a mandate to 
oversee a ceasefire or secure a buffer zone. 
Overall, studies identify a positive association between military and economic 
interventions and conflict duration (Regan 2002a; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000). 
Some research suggests that these results are driven by a subset of cases where 
external interventions were made by actors pursuing their own agenda, which 
results in longer conflicts (Cunningham, 2010). The issue of the intentions of the 
interveners is therefore relevant and is analysed separately ahead. 
Regarding conflict intensity, findings on low-intensity conflict confirm previ-
ous results that military interventions increase the likelihood of conflict escala-
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tion, while economic interventions increase the likelihood of stagnation (Regan 
& Meachum, 2014).
Furthermore, it is difficult to ascertain whether it is the high intensity that at-
tracts interventions or it is the interventions that cause the high intensity conflict. 
Studies have identified that bloodier wars attract more interventions (Elbadawi 
& Sambanis, 2000), which is in contrast to the proposal that interventions are 
more likely to end conflict in high-intensity conflicts but are less likely to occur 
(Regan, 2002a). 
In one study military interventions have been found to decrease conflict dura-
tion when the support is provided to the challenging group (Collier, Hoeffler & 
Söderbom, 2004).
The majority of findings support the proposition of an association between 
military interventions and higher conflict intensity, although the causality of the 
process is less certain. The effect of economic interventions is less pronounced 
and therefore no hypothesis is formulated. 
Hypothesis: Military interventions are associated with, and lead to, higher conflict 
intensity.
The most frequently used diplomatic intervention is mediation, which occurs 
with the consent of both parties and is therefore closer to the conflict manage-
ment intended to de-escalate the conflict (Regan, 2002b). Mediation is defined 
as initiatives for the settlement of disputes “without resort to physical violence” 
(Bercovitch, Anagnoson & Wille, 1991, p. 8). This conflict mitigation criterion oc-
curs equally in other interventions. Elbadawi (1999) distinguishes the military 
and economic types of interventions with what he calls an “external agency” 
type of intervention, which is defined as a “multilateral and essentially neutral 
mode of intervention that is aimed at promoting or facilitating peaceful resolu-
tion of conflicts” (p. 4). 
Results show that diplomacy facilitates the termination of civil war (Regan, 
Frank & Aydin, 2009) even when used alongside economic or military interven-
tion (Regan & Aydin, 2006). Furthermore, longer wars and those with higher 
numbers of deaths attract more mediation initiatives (DeRouen, Bercovitch & 
Pospieszna, 2011). More significantly, diplomacy has a de-escalating effect on 
low-intensity conflict (Regan & Meachum, 2014). 
Considering these results, it can be proposed that there is a positive relation-
ship between diplomatic interventions and conflict de-escalation. 
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Hypothesis: Diplomatic interventions are associated with, and lead to, decreased con-
flict intensity.
Finally, interveners’ motives can be self-centred; for example, they could be 
related to territorial acquisition or to regional stability, protection of the interven-
er’s diplomatic, economic or military interests, ideology, specific international 
politics and superpower rivalry and domestic and organisational politics. The 
intervener’s motives might also be related to cultural affinities with people in 
the target countries. Interventions can be more solidarist or legalist as in the up-
holding of human rights, stopping genocide, promoting democracy or the moral 
commitment of an intervening state (Regan, 1996, 2002a, 2010). In most cases, 
interveners’ motivations are exogenous to the conflict and even UN interventions 
occur for reasons other than the human catastrophe of conflict (Suhrke & Noble, 
1977; Mullenbach, 2005). 
Due to the difficulty of identifying motives in interventions it has been pro-
posed that instead the main mechanisms of interests are the political objectives of 
interveners (Sullivan & Koch, 2009). These can be expressed operationally by the 
biased or neutral nature and type of interventions but also can be inferred from 
the context in which interventions occur. 
While throughout the Cold War states valued sovereignty and order more 
than human rights when considering interventions, in the 1990s the case for hu-
manitarian interventions gain adherence, to the extent that military intervention 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council became an acceptable op-
tion in cases of genocide or mass killing. Moreover humanitarian motivations are 
increasingly used to justify a range of military operations (Bellamy & Wheeler, 
2005). This practice would become the norm of the “Responsibility to Protect” 
which gave the international community a responsibility in securing that states 
protect the populations from mass atrocities, in last resort by undertaking exter-
nal military interventions. But, despite these formulations actors are motivated 
by a complexity of self-centred and altruistic factors. Since the 1990s, interven-
tions have occurred both within and outside the realm of the “Responsibility to 
Protect”, with often disputed humanitarian claims. An investigation of the link of 
each intervention to its humanitarian objectives is out of the scope of the present 
work, nevertheless an account of the extent to which the interventions are re-
sponsive to local humanitarian conditions is possible. Assuming that the more 
intense is the fighting the more acute is the humanitarian situation, it is possible 
to formulate that conflict intensity does not unequivocally attract interventions. 
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Hypothesis: High conflict intensity does not lead to more external interventions.
These hypotheses will be tested for the Somalia conflict for the period be-
tween 1991 and 2010. This period is subdivided into four periods according to 
patterns of conflict intensity and external interventions. The conflict intensity 
data is from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset 
(v1.5) (Melander & Sundberg, 2011) for state-based, non state-based and one-
sided violence. The external interventions information is based on a dataset de-
veloped by the author based on: Regan et al. (2009), Dynamic Analysis of Dispute 
Management (DADM) and other secondary sources. 
Somalia – 1991-2010 
In 1991 the regime of Mohamed Siad Barre was overthrown, ending a 22-year 
military dictatorship. Since this date, central and south Somalia have been in a 
civil war with the absence of a functioning central government. The country has 
also been the target of several external interventions5. 
Map 1: Somalia
Source: United Nations (UN)
5 The analysis focuses on central and south Somalia where most conflict occurred after 1991, and therefore 
Puntland or Somaliland is referred to only in connection with it.
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Map 1 presents the regions of Somalia. Somaliland comprehends the re-
gions of Awdal, Woqooy Galbeed and the western parts of Togdheer, Sanaag 
and Sool where the eastern parts of these three regions, delimited in the cities of 
Buhoodle, Garadag and Laasqoray, are disputed areas. Puntland comprehends 
Bari, Nugaal and the north region of Mudug north of Gaalkacyo. All the area 
south of Gaalkacyo inn Mudug comprehending also the regions of Galguduud, 
Hiraan, Shabelle Dhexe, Shabelle Hoose, Banadir, Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Juba Dhexe 
and Juba Hoose are considered the south-central Somalia (see map 2 ahead for a 
simplified identification of Puntland, Somaliland, the disputed area and south-
central Somalia). Figure 1 presents the timeline of conflict intensity and external 
interventions6.
January 1991 to March 1992 – De-escalation of the conflict by international 
“humanitarian” intervention in the aftermath of the power vacuum left by 
the toppling of the Barre regime 
The overthrow of the Siad Barre regime was marked by open civil war, par-
ticularly between 1988 and 1991. Despite the establishment of the interim gov-
ernment of the United Somali Congress (USC) led by Ali Mahdi Mohammed on 
January 29, 1991, the conflict continued, as identified in Figure 1. 
On July 21, 1991 promoted by external actors (Djibouti, Kenya and Egypt), a 
ceasefire agreement was signed in Djibouti between six political groups without 
the participation of the Somali National Movement (SNM)7. The agreement recog-
nised Ali Mahdi Mohamed, leader of the USC, as head of an interim government, 
but his leadership was contested within the USC, resulting in a split into his USC/
Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), which had its roots in a more sedentary lifestyle, 
and the USC/Somali National Alliance (SNA) headed by General Mohamed Farah 
Aidid, which had its roots in a nomadic lifestyle (Rutherford, 2008). The contest 
would lead to intense fighting for control of the capital, Mogadishu, in the last 
quarter of 1991 and in the south of Somalia in January 1992, which claimed more 
than 4,000 lives in four months (Melander & Sundberg, 2011)8. 
In January 1992 several external actors (the UN, the Arab League, the Islamic 
Conference, the African Union - AU and Ethiopia) mediated on the conflict, which led 
to a ceasefire agreement signed on March 3, 1992 with provisions for a transitional 
governance mechanism and a peace-keeping mission (DADM, 2012). As a result, the 
conflict de-escalated and crystallised into the separation of Mogadishu along the 
6 In the narrative only relevant interventions are identified, even if Figure 1 identifies more interventions.
7 The SNM did not recognize the Mogadishu government, and on May 18, 1991 declared the northwestern Somali 
regions independent as the republic of Somaliland. Ethiopia supported the SNM.
8 In the south two rival warlords, General Siad “Morgan” and Colonel Omar Jess, fought for control of the impor-
tant coastal city of Kismayo (Adebajo, 2011).
68 External interventions and civil war intensity in south-central Somalia (1991-2010)
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos  •  julho-dezembro de 2014  •  28, 57-86
Figure 1: Battle deaths and external interventions in Somalia, 1991-2010
On the left axis are monthly battle-related deaths for state-based and non state-based conflict and 
monthly deaths for one-sided conflict. Number of interventions on the right axis is identified 
for the date of initiation. Timeline axes with year start. For months with more than 300 battle 
deaths, the total number of deaths is reported in a label on top of the chart in the corresponding 
month. The dashed lines correspond to the delimitation of the periods of analysis. Other text 
identifies chronologically relevant events. Legend: TNG – Transitional National Government; TFG – 
Transitional Federal Government; ICU – Mogadishu-Islamic Court Union controls Mogadishu; ETH 
Int.-Mogadishu – Ethiopian intervention controls Mogadishu. Military, economic and diplomatic 
interventions and peacekeeping operations (PKO) are external interventions. 
Sources: Battle death data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset (v1.5) 
(Melander & Sundberg, 2011). Military, economic, diplomatic and PKO interventions  
were identified by the author.
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so-called “green line” separating the territory controlled by the USC/SSA and the 
USC/SNA (Rutherford, 2008). 
With the exception of Mogadishu, up to the early 1990s the nature of the 
conflict in the south was mainly inter-clan, with the Darood (SPM) and Hawiye 
(USC) opposing each other. This conflict, which was characterised by atrocities 
and looting, involved fast-moving campaigns in which large slices of land were 
seized (Menkhaus, 2004). 
The lack of authority and the transition of governance during this period are 
particularly prone to conflict. There was an “end-of-hierarchy” moment (Cramer, 
2002) when the fall of the Barre regime opened up a space for various parties 
to contest authority. The period signalled a transition (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates 
& Gleditsch, 2001) from autocracy to what would become an anarchic, decen-
tralized, stateless system in which “contenders struggle to conquer and defend 
durable resources, without effective regulation by higher authority” (Hirshleifer, 
1995, p. 27). The possibility of reaching an agreement that would hold under 
these conditions came about as a result of a “military stalemate” (Zartman, 2001) 
and international pressure which offered incentives to the parties to allow hu-
manitarian interventions to take place as well as guaranteeing that there would 
be no interference in the dynamics of the conflict. 
April 1992 to October 1996 – Conflict escalation in General Mohamed 
Farah Aidid’s bid for control and the international community’s failure  
to manage the conflict 
In April 1992 the UN approved the United Nations Operation in Somalia I 
(UNOSOM I), with the primary objective of averting a humanitarian catastrophe, at 
a time when an estimated 40 percent of humanitarian food was being hijacked by 
conflicting parties in Somalia. The mission was limited in strength due to the op-
position of General Aidid, who reluctantly only accepted a deployment of troops 
smaller than authorized (Reuters, 1992). Aidid feared that the UN intended to de-
prive him of the presidency, a suspicion reinforced when a plane with UN mark-
ings delivered military equipment to Ali Mahdi Mohammed in north Mogadishu. 
Also, Aidid distrusted Boutros-Ghali, who was considered a pro-Barre person 
since his tenure as deputy foreign minister of Egypt (Adebajo, 2011).
Later in the same year, on December 6, the UN authorized a peace enforce-
ment mission (UNSC 794/1992) to support the UNOSOM I. The mission, called UNITAF 
(United Task Force), was led by the US and had about 37,000 personnel (DADM, 
2012) with a mandate to create conditions for effective humanitarian operations 
70 External interventions and civil war intensity in south-central Somalia (1991-2010)
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos  •  julho-dezembro de 2014  •  28, 57-86
in the southern half of the country, an objective that was ultimately achieved 
(Rutherford, 2008)9.
Also in March 1993 and without consulting General Aidid, an expand-
ed UNOSOM II (UNSC 814/1993) was approved (Rutherford, 2008). This time the 
UNOSOM II had Chapter VII enforcement powers, an authorized force for 1993 of 
28,000 personnel and the mission’s mandate change from feeding the population 
to a large nation-building project including the disarmament of militias. 
This illustrates the change of policy that occurred during the 1990s from a fo-
cus on humanitarian interventions to a focus on conflict resolution and postwar 
reconstruction (Duffield, 2001), alongside the emergence of the third generation 
of peacekeeping operations operating with Chapter VII mandates but without a 
comprehensive acceptance by the conflict parties (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006)10.
On June 5, 1993, the March Agreement was broken when General Aidid’s 
forces attacked UN troops. This was a frequent occurrence and attacks were also 
directed at UNITAF troops (Harbom, Högbladh & Wallensteen, 2006). 
In an escalation of the confrontations, a UN-mandated manhunt was initiated 
to capture the faction leader, General Aidid, which led to the Somalis consid-
ering the UN was a warring faction. In this process the “Black Hawk Down” 
incident occurred in the US-led Operation, Gothic Serpent, on October 3, 1993. 
Eighteen US troops died in that incident and it was estimated that there were 
1,000 deaths among General Aidid’s military supporters and civilians (Adebajo, 
2011). This event marked the end of American involvement not only in Somalia 
but in humanitarian interventions elsewhere and lead to the termination of the 
UNOSOM II in March 1995. It was the end of the “assertive multilateralism” (Doyle 
& Sambanis, 2006) or also called military humanitarianism (Duffield, 1994) initi-
ated in January 1991 with the Gulf War.
General Aidid (USC/SNA) proclaimed himself president on June 15, 1995, and 
Libya recognized his government on November 6, 1995 (DADM, 2012). But Ali 
Mahdi Mohamed (USC/SSA) contested it and the country continued to be engaged 
in conflict (Dow Jones, 1995). From 1995 up to the first half of 1997, intense fight-
ing returned mainly to the cities of the administrative region of Lower Shabelle, 
including Mogadishu, and in neighbouring administrative regions. Most con-
flicts involved the USC/SNA fighting the USC/SSA or other parties (Melander & 
Sundberg, 2011). 
9 Nevertheless the humanitarian achievements of the intervention have been questioned (Weiss, 1999, pp. 82-
87).
10 First generation peacekeeping are interposition forces deployed after a truce is reached under the banner of im-
partiality, neutrality and consent. Second generation peacekeeping are the multidimensional operations with the 
consent of the parties. Fourth generation are the delegated peacekeeping operations (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). 
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This period was characterised by a process in which a light humanitarian in-
tervention gradually assumed enforcement powers, to end up being a political 
mission attempting to remove a warlord (Betts, 1994). 
Nevertheless, in spite of the failure to establish peace in the country and the 
continuation of a stateless conflict, the intervention decreased the intensity of the 
conflict significantly from early 1992 until the middle of 1996, with the exception 
of a few periods. Also, the conflict became more localised, briefer and less costly 
in terms of human lives, and with less damage to property. At the same time, 
atrocities and looting became less common and warlords became less of a factor 
vis a vis the relevance of clan conflict (Menkhaus, 2004). 
From 1991 onwards centrifugal forces fragmented the clan families, which led 
to intra-clan rivalries, in the case of Mogadishu with conflict over a single city 
block (Menkhaus, 2003). Notwithstanding other relevant processes and actors, 
Menkhaus’s (2007) proposition that since the signing of the Djibouti agreement 
in 1991, the conflict in Somalia could be seen as a contest for control of political 
and economic power in Mogadishu between two factions of the Hawiye clan 
(General Aidid and Ali Mahdi’s clans) is confirmed in the above analysis of the 
process and the conflict itself.
November 1996 to May 2005 – Intra/inter clan conflict and ascension of the 
ICU amidst international disengagement and regional efforts for mediation
In November 1996, in Sodere, Ethiopia, the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) initiated me-
diation initiatives between 26 faction leaders (Dagne, 2010), with follow-up meet-
ings throughout 1997 mediated by Ethiopia. 
But this negotiation process collapsed when Egypt convened a meeting of 
Somali groups in Cairo in December 1997, which led to the Cairo Declaration on 
Somalia (ibid.). The agreement included provisions for a ceasefire and an interim 
government but was not signed by some parties and would never be implement-
ed (Harbom et al., 2006). This initiative would also lose momentum when another 
peace conference was convened in Somalia in 1998. 
The conflict between February 1998 and February 2000 featured several clash-
es of lower intensity, mainly in central and south Somalia, involving not only 
the USC/SNA and the USC/SSA but also a series of other forces. The frequency and 
intensity of the fighting would only decrease temporarily with the initiation of 
the Somali Reconciliation Conference in May 2000 (see Figure 1)11. 
11 In August 1998, the northeastern Somali region of Puntland declared itself an autonomous state, with Abdullahi 
Yussuf as its president. Puntland status as an autonomous state was different from the un-recognised self- 
declared sovereign states of Somaliland. 
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This peace process was mediated internationally (Arab League, Libya and 
IGAD) and involved a meeting of 400 delegates in Djibouti (it was boycotted 
by several powerful warlords as well as the governments of Somaliland and 
Puntland [Dagne, 2010]). By August participants had agreed to a Transitional 
National Government (TNG), with a three-year mandate, and a Transitional 
National Assembly (TNA) that nominated Abdiqassim Salad Hassan as president. 
The TNG was dominated by the “Mogadishu group”, which was backed by the 
Arab world, was anti-Ethiopian, included Islamists in its alliance, had a vision 
of a strong central government and was dominated by lineages of the Hawiye 
clan (Menkhaus, 2007). The new government was promising for a short time 
when, facilitated by Libya, it was able to sign a reconciliation pact with Hussein 
Mohamed Farah Aidid of the USC-SNA in September 2000. As a result, the inten-
sity of the conflict decreased for about a year (DADM, 2012)12. 
But the government was being challenged by an alliance of warlords, the 
Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). The SRRC was headed by 
Abdullahi Yusuf, president of the autonomous state of Puntland. The SRRC was 
backed by Ethiopia, was anti-Islamic, based mainly outside Mogadishu, federal-
ist and dominated by lineages of the Darood clan (Menkhaus, 2007). In June 2001 
Ethiopia made a failed attempt to mediate between the TNG and the SRRC (DADM, 
2012), after which there was intense fighting from June to October 2001. 
On September 11, 2001 the terrorists attacks in the United States would recon-
ceptualise security concerns worldwide with implications for Somalia. The at-
tacks were linked to an Islamist group, Al-Qaeda, which had struck before in 
the region on August 7, 1998, when it bombed the United States embassies in 
Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (Dagne, 2010). 
In the aftermath of the 1993 “Black Hawk Down” incident the United States 
(US) ignored Somalia but its policy changed because of its need to fight Al-Qaeda. 
Initially the US recruited warlords to seize terrorist suspects in the country 
(Hartley, 2006). A consequence of this policy was a decrease in the power of the 
transitional government (Hartley, 2005) and in the power of clan structures, rein-
forcing the power of warlords. Another consequence was that the US support to 
warlords had a backlash by increasing Somali support for the Islamic alternative 
of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, which would grow in the following years (Scahill, 
2011). Adding to this strategy by late 2001 the US, the largest player in counter-
terrorism in Somalia, increase its operations and established a military base in 
Djibouti, which lead to the seizure of some high profile jihadi leaders in subse-
12 Egypt and Sudan expressed diplomatic support for the new government.
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quent years (ICG, 2005)13. Some accounts suggest that between 2001 and 2014 US 
undertook between 13 to 19 drone strikes or attacks resulting in between 50 to 
165 reported killed (Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2012). 
On October 15, 2002, a two-year negotiation process started in Kenya. It was 
organized by IGAD and involved the TNG and representatives of 22 Somali fac-
tions; some factions and the government of Somaliland did not attend. During 
this negotiation process some of the conflict in the Bay region (and Puntland) 
related to previous tensions between the clans and leaders of the administrative 
region turned violent when criteria had to be used to select participants in this 
mediation process (Menkhaus, 2004).
The first phase of the process involved the signing of ceasefire agreements, 
which the parties routinely broke. Despite this, phase two was initiated. It in-
tended to address the root causes of the conflict and focused on how to ad-
dress issues related to territorial occupation and conquest in southern Somalia 
(Menkhaus, 2006). But negotiations were fruitless and the mediators decided to 
move to phase three of a power-sharing agreement (Menkhaus, 2007).
In September 2003 IGAD (with the active involvement of Ethiopia), the AU, 
the UN and the Arab League, organized a forum where the parties agreed to a 
Transitional National Charter (TNC), paving the way for a government of national 
unity, even if some factions were not present at the negotiations. As a result, in 
August 2004, a 275-member Transitional Parliament was inaugurated in Kenya; 
it was formed along the principle of a consociational democracy, based on clan 
families’ representation. On October 10, 2004, Abdullahi Yusuf was elected presi-
dent of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) by an electoral college based 
on a coalition pact instead of a national unity project. The swearing-in ceremo-
ny was attended by 11 heads of government from African countries and repre-
sentatives from regional organisations and the United Nations (Dagne, 2010). 
Abdullahi Yusuf was closer to Ethiopia and while in office he followed a policy 
of imposing a victor’s peace on the adversaries – the TNG and the “Mogadishu 
group” (Menkhaus, 2007). 
The creation of the TFG and its policies provoked a reaction in Mogadishu 
where a militant youth – the Shabaab – developed and began assassinating TFG 
members and supporters (ICG, 2005). In this context, the United States rein-
forced the programme of capturing suspected Al-Qaeda members in the country 
(Bruton, 2010).
Between December 2001 and early 2006 most of the conflict involved sever-
al other parties besides the TFG and occurred throughout central and southern 
13 Besides assault and capture, covert operations can also be of surveillance and reconnaissance.
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Somalia, not only in Mogadishu, and spread to villages in the Shabelle and Bay 
regions. Most of the fighting was intra-clan or intra-faction rivalry, with some 
inter-clan and inter-factional conflict. There were fewer instances of conflict di-
rectly involving the TFG or against civilians (see Figure 1). 
This period was characterised by opposing regional interests playing out dip-
lomatic initiatives, which pre-empted any chance of successful agreement. The 
Somalia conflict becomes a proxy for the regional dispute between countries of 
the Muslim Arab world, headed by Egypt, and of the Christian Horn of Africa 
region, headed by Ethiopia. It was a dispute that also extended to the military 
support provided to the parties throughout the conflict14. The rivalry between 
Egypt and Ethiopia can be attributed to each being a regional power and the 
competition between both countries over the Nile’s water (Dehéz & Gebrewold, 
2010), with Somalia constituting a counterweight to Ethiopian control of the Nile 
(Bradbury, 2008).
The main diplomatic initiatives would not be directly associated to conflict in-
tensity but occurred in the context of years of lower intensity conflict. Only when 
the balance of capabilities started to shift significantly in favour of the ICU in 2006, 
did international support for the conflicting parties become military. Despite the 
intensification of covert operations as a result of the “war on terror”, there is no 
significant increase on the battle deaths in the period. 
June 2005 to 2010 – Foreign regional and international intervention and 
conflict escalation15 
In the first half of 2006 the conflict dynamics would change significantly with 
the emergence of the Islamic Court Union (ICU). The ICU was a heterogeneous 
group of eleven Sharia courts with some radical individuals, namely Sheik Hassan 
Dahir Aweys, a salafist who used to head the Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Ittihaad al-
Islami (AIAI), and Adan Hashi Farah Ayro, a jihadist in charge of the Al-Shaabab 
militia, who was killed in a US airstrike in May 2008 (Moller, 2009)16. 
The ICU had been established in mid-2005 and its rise to power was due to 
the growing influence of the courts as a source of law and order, the support of 
the business community that was interested mainly in public security and the 
clan-based backlash against international efforts to counter terrorism and state 
14 See, for instance, Egypt’s involvement in 2006 (UN, 2006), the same year of the Ethiopian military interven-
tion.
15 During this period there were three Somali-led peace processes not identified in the narrative due to their 
national nature: the Idale peace process (2004-2007), the Jijeele and Gaalje’el peace process (Hiran, 2007) and the 
Mudug-Galgadud peace process (2005-2007) (Johnson, 2009).
16  Salafism emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century as a reaction to the spread of European ideas 
demanding a return to traditional Islamic practices (Kepel, 2002), and jihadism refers to the struggle against 
those who do not believe in Islam.
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building through warlords (Bruton, 2010). The ICU was initially aligned with the 
“Mogadishu group” but in 2005 a rift developed between both as a result of a 
regional administration dispute which led to them becoming two distinct interest 
groups (ICG, 2006). In the months ahead, this would enable the ICU to further cap-
italize on the population’s desire to terminate warlords’ power17 (Hartley, 2005). 
In tandem with the rise of the ICU, the United States promoted the establish-
ment of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), 
which was made public in February 2006. The alliance was constituted by Hawiye 
clan militia leaders and businessmen and was the main military opponent to ICU 
growth (Menkhaus, 2007). Despite the fact that US intelligence could not identify 
by 2005 that there was Al-Qaeda or Al Itihad Al Islamiya bases in the country 
(Menkhaus, 2005) the active support was justified by the assessment of George 
W. Bush’s administration that the ICU was a de-facto Al-Qaeda-supporting or-
ganisation that was on the verge of controlling an African capital (Scahill, 2011). 
Between February and June 2006 the ICU’s bid to control Mogadishu was 
opposed by the TFG and the ARPCT, in what is known as the second battle for 
Mogadishu (Bruton, 2010). Both sides had diverse forms of military and econom-
ic support throughout 2005 and 2006, some in breach of the UN arms embargo 
(UNSC S/2006/229). The support for the TFG came from Ethiopia, Yemen, Saudi 
Arabia, Uganda and the USA, and support for the ICU from Eritrea, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Djibouti, Libya, Syria and Egypt (Regan & Aydin, 2006; DADM, 2012).
By mid-June 2006 the ICU triumphed not only in Mogadishu but in much of 
the central and southern regions of Somalia. Sudan, Yemen and the Arab League 
promoted a mediation process in late June 2006 proposing a power-sharing 
agreement between the ICU and the TFG, but without results. In the negotiations 
both parties avoided serious concessions; the ICU was convinced of political and 
military advantage and the TFG was confident of Western backing and fearful of 
having to lose too much in the negotiations18 (Bruton, 2010). 
There was a series of dynamics of ICU control in the second half of 2006. One 
dynamic was that for the first time since 1991, Mogadishu was not immersed in 
the mayhem of warlords’ wars; some order and security had been established 
and some services were reported to have been provided (Scahill, 2011; Hartley, 
2006). This was largely the result of an authoritarian ICU, concentrating power by: 
replacing non-central authorities with the courts; forbidding civil society groups; 
replacing customary law with sharia law; ending neighbourhood watch patrols; 
17 In 2005 a short lived civic movement emerged out of the Mogadishu Security and Stabilization Plan (MSSP) 
against the war-prone political elite in the city (Menkhaus, 2007).
18  Puntland and Somaliland oppose the ICU.
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and marginalizing some traditional elders, civic leaders and business people 
(Menkhaus, 2006). Another dynamic was that within the traditionally moderate 
Islamic population of Somalia the ICU had become radicalized. Among the meas-
ures taken was a ban on Western cultural expressions, a prohibition of the popu-
lar stimulant qat and an increase in taxes on the business community (Bruton, 
2010; Hartley, 2006). But a more significant dynamic, especially for the Ethiopian 
decision to intervene decisively later in 2006, was the ICU’s position on calls for 
jihad against Ethiopia; appeals to the people of Ethiopia to overthrow its govern-
ment; close links with Eritrea; the provision of logistical support and bases to 
two armed insurgent groups opposing the Ethiopian Government, which had in-
creased activity in the country; and a revival of the “greater Somalia” project, with 
territorial claims in all of Somalia’s neighbouring countries, but especially to the 
Ogaden region, over which Ethiopia and Somalia fought between 1977 and 1978 
(Menkhaus, 2007)19. Moreover, the possibility of a stable Islamic-inspired country 
emerging in Somalia could be seen as a platform to strengthen the Muslim popu-
lation of Ethiopia, the biggest group after the orthodox Christians. 
Between June and October 2006 Ethiopia unsuccessfully attempted negotia-
tions between the TFG and the UIC (Aimé, 2013). By October Ethiopia declared it 
was “technically at war” with the ICU, and on December 24, with an overwhelm-
ing force of about 20,000 troops fighting alongside the TFG troops, it launched an 
offensive against the UIC, unseating it from Mogadishu on December 28, 2006 
(Menkhaus, 2007)20. This changed the dynamic and intensity of the conflict sig-
nificantly.
Formally, the Ethiopian regime justified the non-authorised intervention in 
Somalia on the grounds of the right to individual and collective self-defence 
against a terrorist threat from a regime that could harbour terrorists. It was also 
argued that the intervention was in response to a request by Abdullahi Yusuf, 
the TFG leader, for a military force to help the government (Warbrick & Yihdego, 
2006). Besides the historical and strategic reasons presented above, as well as 
the regime’s stated motivations, a more immediate motivation was associated 
with the contested elections of Ethiopia’s Zenawi regime in May 2005 and the 
subsequent crackdown on the opposition with serious human rights violations 
(US Department of State, 2006). This resulted in strong international criticism, 
particularly from the United States Congress which discussed in early 2006 the 
possibility of Ethiopia losing United States aid. By assuming the role of the re-
19 The “greater Somalia” project threat is an issue of contention among analysts, but UIC leader Sheik Hassan 
Dahir Aweys, in an interview on June 22, 2006, claimed Ogaden as a Somalia region (Norland, 2006).
20 Throughout 2005 and 2006 Ethiopia proposed this mission to be executed through IGAD, but despite the back-
ing of the AU, it failed to get the necessary regional and international support (Sousa, 2013). 
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gional power fighting the “war on terror” Prime Minister Meles Zenawi assumed 
an important role, which outweighed concerns over human rights. In the end the 
Ethiopian regime would continue to receive aid and diplomatic support from the 
international community, including the United States (Aimé, 2013). 
Two specific sources of external support require highlighting. One was the 
US’s unequivocal support for the Ethiopian intervention, even if such support 
was not necessarily operational (Bruton, 2010; Scahill, 2011). In either case, it is 
considered that the Ethiopian offensive would have occurred, regardless of the 
US support and therefore could not be considered per se as a subcontract of the 
“war on terror” (Menkhaus, 2007). But although Ethiopia intervened regularly 
in Somalia to weaken Islamist militant groups or strengthen allies (Bradbury, 
2008), the scale of the 2006 intervention was unprecedented21. Another source 
of support for the ICU was Eritrea, which supplied equipment and training and 
eventually 2,000 troops (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, 2006), although this 
was disputed. This support was justified solely by the enduring rivalry between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, which started with the war they fought between 1998 and 
2000. 
When forced to retreat in December 2006, the ICU leadership stated that it 
would resort to guerrilla tactics, pledged alliance to Al-Qaeda (Scahill, 2011), and 
saw the second top figure in Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, call for a jihad against 
Ethiopia and the TFG (Warbrick & Yihdego, 2006). The ICU would disintegrate 
into different smaller factions, among them the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of 
Somalia/Union of Islamic Courts (ARS/ICU); the Al-Shabaab, which would join Al-
Qaeda in 2012, and the Harakat Ras Kambooni. 
The intensity of the conflict from January 2007 onwards increased significant-
ly. This time the conflict was mostly against the TFG and Ethiopian troops; in 2007 
mainly by the ARS/ICU and was centred mainly in Mogadishu. The warfare was 
based on attacks on Ethiopian convoys, military installations, TFG buildings and 
vital infrastructure, through classical ambushes with AK-47s, mortars and rock-
et-propelled grenades. Some new tactics included suicide bombings, roadside 
bombs and targeted assassinations (Menkhaus, 2007). 
The insurgency was not exclusively Islamic and brought together different 
groups in a movement that could better be characterised as a “complex insur-
gency” of clan militia and warlords. Only from 2008 onwards did the Islamic Al-
Shabaab become the main insurgent force in Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia. 
By the end of 2008 Al-Shabaab had been able to retake most of southern Somalia, 
21 For instance, the intervention in Puntland in November 2001 was executed with a 1,000-strong contingent 
(Agence France-Press, 2001).
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with its leadership concentrated on the southern coast and in the port city of 
Kismayo. By January 2010 insurgent groups were still in control of most of south-
central Somalia (Dagne, 2010).
The foreign presence in Somalia, especially of Ethiopians and Americans, 
was the main contributing factor to the high conflict intensity during this pe-
riod by increasing the capacity of the Al-Shabaab to recruit local and foreign ji-
hadists. The presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia was seen as an occupation 
reviving Somalian nationalism. At the same time, it was a source of serious hu-
man rights violations that were also perpetrated by the TFG and African Union 
(Bruton, 2010)22. Furthermore, the United States was perceived as a supporter 
of the Ethiopian troops as it had launched missile attacks against ICU leaders in 
January 2007 that caused numerous civilian casualties (Menkhaus, 2007). 
The replacement of Ethiopian troops was a political and military priority. 
In order to replace them, the African Union established the African Mission for 
Somalia (AMISOM) on January 19, 2007. The UN Security Council endorsed the 
AMISOM on February 21, 2007 with a UN Charter Chapter VII mandate (UN SC 1744) 
mainly to support the TFG. The mission began deployment of a planned 8,000 
troops, but by the end of the year it had only 1,700 troops from Uganda and 
Burundi. Up to the beginning of 2010 the AMISOM would never reach more than 
about half of its authorised strength (4,300 troops by April 2009). The failure to 
attract the commitment of contributing countries was due mainly to the danger-
ous environment of operations and the lack of stable funding and capabilities 
(Williams, 2009).
The UN started mediation in May 2008, which led to the signing of the Djibouti 
Agreement between the TFG and ARS/ICU on August 19, 2008. The agreement stip-
ulated a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces and the deployment of a 
United Nations peacekeeping force. In January 2009 a faction of the ARS/ICU, the 
Djibouti branch, merged with the TFG to form a winning coalition in parliament 
that would elect Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a moderate sufi and former ICU 
commander in chief, as president in January 2009 (Bruton, 2010). 
Even though it had to rely exclusively on the poorly staffed AMISOM, the with-
drawal of Ethiopian troops occurred in January 2009. At the end of the interven-
tion it is estimated that about 6,000 Ethiopian troops were still deployed; there-
fore, the intervention force totalled around 10,000 troops in 2009 (Aimé, 2013). 
To compensate for the Ethiopian troop withdrawal, the International Conference 
on Somalia held in Brussels in April 2009 decided to increase the reimburse-
22 For instance, the TFG was involved in indiscriminate shelling of civilian neighbourhoods and withholding 
food aid in the midst of famine (Menkhaus, 2007).
79Ricardo Real Pedrosa de Sousa
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos  •  julho-dezembro de 2014  •  28, 57-86
ment rate of the AMISOM troops from US$550 to US$1028 per soldier per month, 
which significantly renewed the interest of countries contributing to the mission 
(Williams, 2009). Over the next years the deployment of troops would increase 
significantly, reaching 11,000 troops by 2011 and a full revised strength of 17,000 
by 2012 (IPSS, 2012).
Map 2: Political map of Somalia
Source: Wiklund (2013)
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The intensity of conflict would increase in 2009 and 2010, between Al-Shabaab 
and the TFG and between Al-Shabaab and the moderate sufi group of Ahlu Sunna 
Waljamaca, both of which were in Mogadishu and in the centre and south of 
Somalia. During this period the conflict was the most intense it had been since 
the overthrow of Barre’s regime. At this stage the conflict had a religious con-
figuration connected to clan politics and raged alongside an international force 
attempting to establish a functioning government. 
Since 2010 there have been two additional military interventions, both in late 
2011. One was by Ethiopia and another by Kenya, both to help the TFG and the 
AMISOM defeat Al-Shabaab. Kenya intervened in the south along its border to 
protect its national interests (it would integrate its forces in the AMISOM in 2012), 
while Ethiopia intervened from the West (Wiklund, 2013). By 2013 a series of ac-
tors had gained control of central and south Somalia: the AMISOM directly control-
led Mogadishu, the road to Baidoa and the southern border area with Kenya; the 
pro-government militia, supported by Ethiopia or directly by Ethiopian troops 
and local militia, controlled the interior border areas with Ethiopia; Islamist 
groups controlled the coastal and interior areas of central Somalia and part of 
the south; and a pro-government administration controlled the northern region 
bordering Puntland (see Map 2).
More generally, and according to Merkhaus (2007), this period was also a con-
tinuation of the Hawiye intra-clan conflict, with the UIC being an Islamic cover for 
a Hawiye sub-clan (the Haber Gedir Ayr) to fight the equally Hawiye sub-clan 
of the ARPCT. Nevertheless, the confrontation with the TFG was more of an inter-
clan affair as the TFG was of the Darood clan, which was dominated mainly by 
the Mijerteen sub-clan. 
Results 
In Somalia a unique combination of factors has determined internal and ex-
ternal actors’ conflict behaviour. Internal factors (even if they have external links) 
are the main divisive elements in inter- and intra-clan conflictive culture, which 
exists in tandem with warlordism. These actors often engage in opportunistic be-
haviour, shortsighted politics and zero-sum views, which result in an abundance 
of spoilers for peace building, state building and central authority projects. 
This confluence of internal and external spoiler behaviours exist together with 
other structural factors such as environmental degradation (drought, erosion, de-
forestation), poverty, legacies of colonization and Cold War geopolitics, demo-
graphic pressures, diaspora or the ethnic composition of the country. A divisive 
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issue in the country is the control of resources (Dias, 2013), either renewable re-
sources, mainly land and water, or control of the state and economy, particularly 
of the livestock trade, which is associated with the pastoralist culture. 
The effects of military interventions on conflict intensity depend on the nature 
of the conflict and the objectives of the intervention. Two main overarching peri-
ods can be identified in Somalia. During the first, from 1991 to 2006, the conflict 
was mainly of an inter- and intra-clan nature of lower intensity and with regional 
links; the second period occurred after 2006 when the conflict assumed a higher 
intensity because of its religious Islamic nature and associations people ascribed 
to it with the “global war on terror” (Hoehne, 2009). 
Within this context the case study shows that neutral military interventions 
have the capacity to decrease conflict intensity, and they normally happen after 
a peace agreement is established. Partisan military interventions, intended to in-
crease the capacity of one side, lead to an escalation of the conflict if both sides 
are being supported. The early 1990s interventions by the US and UN occurred in 
the context of a relative stalemate in the conflict and had humanitarian objectives; 
therefore, they left the political-military balance in the field untouched. Such mis-
sions were able to decrease conflict intensity. When the mission’s mandate was 
changed in 1992 with potential effects on the balance of the parties’ capabilities, it 
faced violent resistance and the intervener decided to withdraw. 
The military intervention initiated in 2006 to support the TFG (which involved 
Ethiopia, Kenya and the AMISOM) aimed to alter the balance of capabilities in 
favour of the TFG. This support was counterbalanced by support for the Islamic 
groups (especially from Eritrea) and anti-intervention feelings from Somalis. The 
result was that no party was able to acquire an overwhelming capacity to defeat 
its opponents. 
Diplomatic interventions, which are neutral, have been associated with lower 
conflict intensity, but have no causal effect if they are partisan. Neutral media-
tions throughout the conflict period have led to periods of decreased conflict 
intensity, although never full peace, due to the number of spoilers. Such was the 
case in the early 1990s and 1997. But if the mediations are partisan, in support 
of one side or another, they have no impact on conflict intensity, regardless of 
achieving peace agreements, such as between 1998 and 2003. 
Contrary to expectations, there are three situations in which diplomatic inter-
ventions may lead to higher conflict intensity. The first is in determining which 
parties are entitled to be at the negotiation table. This had at least two mani-
festations: one in 1993 when clans were favoured for negotiations in detriment 
of civic and traditional authority, therefore setting incentives for eligibility on 
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the side of militias. The other manifestation was in 2004 when parties competed 
for eligibility for admission to the negotiation table. A second situation refers 
to when an agreement is reached but is not all-inclusive and leaves out parties 
who then engage in high-intensity fighting to signal their relevance. Such was the 
case in 1991, when the agreement was rendered void. A third situation is when 
negotiations fail and the parties become committed to a military solution, having 
exhausted a political process, as happened in 2006. 
High-intensity conflict attracts more neutral interventions, such as military 
interventions with a humanitarian objective and diplomatic interventions, as in 
the early post-Cold War era. But in the post-September 11 “global war on terror” 
higher intensity conflict with radical Islamic groups acquiring power led to par-
tisan military interventions in support of the internationally recognised govern-
ment. Diplomatic initiatives are associated with both higher and lower conflict 
intensity periods. 
Conclusion 
This study focuses on national peace processes but recognizes this as a limi-
tation. Lowering the level of analysis to the micro level of regions’ or villages’ 
initiatives could enhance the explanatory power of interventions in conflict, es-
pecially regarding the effect of diplomatic initiatives not supported by external 
actors or the relevance of which peace plans are being discussed and how appro-
priate they are for dealing with the challenges Somalia faces (Bradbury, 2008). 
The assumption that external interventions are mainly peace promoting can 
be traced back to the late 1990s when a framework was developed to protect 
people in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide – the responsibility to protect. 
In this paper interventions are to be justified not only when civilian populations 
are targeted, but also more broadly when conflict intensity has increased signifi-
cantly. Military, economic and diplomatic interventions are tools actors use to in-
fluence the outcomes of conflict. Different types of interventions affect conflict in-
tensity differently, and different objectives of the same type of intervention have 
different results. Partisan military interventions escalate conflict while neutral 
interventions have no significant effect. Partisan diplomatic interventions that 
support both sides have no effect on conflict intensity, but if they are neutral, they 
can be associated with lower conflict intensity. The motivations of the actors did 
not seem to be directly linked to conflict intensity, specifically after the middle of 
the 1990s. Overall, the assumption that interventions promote peace is rejected. 
Instead, the peace objective may compete with other objectives in a constellation 
of external and internal actors’ motivations and initiatives.
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